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Treating Kids Right: Deconstructing and
Reconstructing the Amenability to
Treatment Concept
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN*

I. INTRODUCTION

The concept of amenability to treatment is, in theory, at the core of
juvenile delinquency jurisprudence. From its inception as an entity
separate from the adult criminal court, the juvenile court was meant to
focus on the rehabilitative potential of children.1 On this premise, the
central inquiry in a juvenile delinquency proceeding should be whether
the child found delinquent is amenable to treatment. Disposition should
depend upon the rehabilitative potential and needs of the juvenile, and
only if no treatment is available in the juvenile system should transfer to
adult court be considered.
In practice, amenability to treatment may never have been the focal
point that theory suggests it should have been,2 and it is clearly of

*
Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin School of
Law. This article originated as a concept paper for the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation Research Program on Adolescent Development and Juvenile
Justice. My thanks to Elizabeth Scott, Thomas Grisso and Frank Zimring for their
comments on an earlier version of this draft.
1. THE INVENTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 551 (Frederic L. Faust & Paul J.
Brantingham eds., 1974) (according to the "orthodox" view of the juvenile court system,
the juvenile court "was a legal bridge between the troubled child and the agencies of
amelioration."); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 691, 709 (1991) (the original purpose of the juvenile court system emphasized
"rehabilitation and the child's 'best interests"').
2. See generally ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY (1969).

secondary importance today.3 The vagueness of the concept, the
inadequacy of treatment programs, and the influence of retributive and
incapacitative agendas have helped push it into the background.
Nonetheless, legislatures and courts still endorse treatment amenability
as an important consideration in delinquency cases. Most commentators
also remain attracted to the original rehabilitation-based philosophy of
the juvenile court, although their positions vary substantially.4
Given the centrality of the amenability construct to juvenile justice
theory, one would expect a significant amount of commentary in the
legal literature about how the courts interpret the concept. Yet the topic
has been all but ignored by legal scholars. There does exist a substantial
body of social science research identifying factors that correlate with
judicial decisions to transfer a juvenile to adult court.5 But critical
analysis of amenability law, whether in the transfer setting or elsewhere
in the juvenile process, is strangely lacking.6 This article attempts to
help fill this void by surveying relevant statutory law and caselaw, as
well as pertinent sociological data.
The principal conclusion drawn from this survey is probably not
surprising to those who know the system:7 the amenability to treatment
inquiry often ends up being an inquiry about something else. Rather
than focusing on treatability, the courts appear to be driven by a mix of
incapacitative, retributive and rehabilitative concerns, with the latter
focus routinely taking a back seat to the first two objectives.
Furthermore, it appears that the law-at least the law one finds in
statutes and in appellate decisions-has paid little attention to the

3.
Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a
Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 57, 63-64 (1992) (arguing that new

prosecutorial and legislative waiver provisions remove from the juvenile system those
children who are most in need of treatment).
4.

Compare Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the

Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991),
with Irene M. Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court
Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 163.
5. See Part II(C) of this article.
6. Podkopacz and Feld prefaced their description of their 1996 empirical study of
waiver by stating "there is remarkably little research on the determinants of waiver .... '9
Marcy R. Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of
Judicial Waiver, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 449,451 (1996).

7. As a presidential commission put it years ago, transfer decisions are often
"[n]ot a scientific evaluation of whether the youth will respond successfully to a juvenile
court disposition but a front for society's insistence on retribution or social protection."
TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 24 (1967).

[Vol. 10: 299, 1999]

Treating Kids Right
THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

insights of social science about the factors that might be relevant to
treatability.
Part II of this article discusses the legal meaning of the treatment
amenability concept, particularly focusing on judicial interpretation of
amenability in the transfer context, where litigation has been heaviest.
Part III critically analyzes the law's approach to amenability. It
concludes that both the factors considered by the courts and the way
those factors are applied are deficient. Part IV describes the research
implications of the foregoing discussion. Part V concludes with brief
suggestions for revamping the amenability inquiry.
This article does not address the fundamental issue of whether the
rehabilitation orientation of the juvenile court should be reinvigorated
(although this author believes that it should be).8 It does suggest ways
such reinvigoration might take place. Among them are reconceptualization of the amenability concept, improved guidelines for assessing it,
and restructured treatment programs.
II. THE LAW'S DEFINITION OF AMENABILITY TO TREATMENT

The treatment amenability inquiry permeates the juvenile court
process, from intake through disposition.9 Yet virtually all the caselaw
on the subject comes from litigation focused on just one stage of the
process: the decision whether juvenile court jurisdiction ought to be
8. See Christopher Slobogin et al., A Preventive Model of Juvenile Justice: The
Promise of Kansas v. Hendricksfor Children, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 185 (1999). Numerous
arguments have been made against such an orientation, among them: (1) that juveniles
are no more treatable than adults, Anna L. Simpson, Comment, Rehabilitation as the
Justificationof a Separate Juvenile Justice System, 64 CAL. L. REV. 984, 984-85 (1976);
(2) that treatment has not been shown to "substantially" reduce recidivism and "[t]here is
no reason to suppose that we are approaching a breakthrough", Franklin E. Zimring,
Dealing with Youth Crime: National Needs and Federal Priorities, Report to the
Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 8 (Sept. 1975); (3)
that intervention might actually increase recidivism, id. at 23; and (4) that "[tihe juvenile
court has demonstrated a remarkable ability to deflect, co-opt, and absorb ameliorative
reform virtually without institutional change," Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile
Justice: Rules of Procedurefor the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 276 (1984).
9. For a general treatment of the stages of the juvenile process and their
interaction with the amenability issue, see GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 426-28 (2d ed. 1997) (describing treatment

considerations at the intake, dispositional bargaining, transfer, dispositional, and postdispositional stages).

"waived." Consonant with the initial rehabilitative premise of the
juvenile court, traditional theory posited that children who are amenable
to treatment in the juvenile system should not be transferred to adult
court. Of course, in many states today, that is not even the theory, much
less the practice. The modem statutory trend is to require transfer in
situations involving violent crimes and certain age thresholds,' ° and to
make amenability a secondary issue even when transfer is
discretionary." Nonetheless, treatment amenability remains a central
issue, at least as a formal matter, for most children subject to transfer.
Thus, the following discussion draws heavily from transfer law.
The most influential source of law on amenability to treatment in the
transfer context has been the appendix to the Supreme Court's opinion in
Kent v. United States.'2 Neither endorsed nor relied upon by the Court,
this appendix consisted entirely of a memorandum setting forth the
criteria governing disposition of waiver requests in the juvenile court

10.
In recent years a number of states have granted prosecutors non-appealable
discretion to file juvenile cases in adult court, usually circumscribed by age and offense
criteria (prosecutorial waiver). Additionally, many states mandate transfer for juveniles
of a certain age or who have committed certain offenses (legislative waiver). See
Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen to the Children: The Decision to Transfer Juveniles
to Adult Court, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 507, 521 (1995). For a state-by-state
description of transfer statutes, see Kirk Heilbrun et al., A National Survey of U.S.
Statutes on Juvenile Transfer: Implicationsfor Policy and Practice, 15 BEHAV. Sci. & L.
125, 128-43 (1997).
11.
See, e.g., State v. Doe, 704 P.2d 1109 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that New
Mexico's transfer statute does not require a finding as to amenability); In re Appeal in
Pima County Juvenile Action, 708 P.2d 776 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (under new
regulations, "the juvenile court is no longer required to make a finding of nonamenability
before it may order.., transfer."); State v. A.L., 638 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1994) (discussing
modification of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 from a presumption of amenability to a presumption
of nonamenability); State v. M.M., 386 S.E.2d 35, 37 (Ga. 1989) (where transfer is based
on severity of crime the state need not prove nonamenability).
12.
383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966). The Kent factors that might be relevant to
amenability to treatment are: (1) The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community
and whether the protection of the community requires waiver; (2) Whether the alleged
offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner; (3)
Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight
being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted; (6) The
sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his home,
environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living; (7) The record and
previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with the Youth Aid
Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior
periods of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions; (8) the
prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable
rehabilitation of the juvenile by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently
available to the Juvenile Court.
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involved in Kent. Ironically the policy, promulgated in 1959, was
rescinded before Kent was decided in 1966. Yet its list of factors now
appears in some version in most state transfer statutes, 3 probably
because Kent is the Supreme Court's only decision dealing directly with
the transfer decision. Other definitional sources include the American
Bar Association's Juvenile Justice Standards 14 and the National
Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals,' 5 both of
which have been important influences on state law, although much less
so than the "Kent criteria." Finally, a number of state legislatures and
courts have devised their own approach to the amenability issue.
The discussion that follows examines first what these sources say
about the fundamental definitional issue: amenability to treatment for
what purpose? It then describes the types of factors courts consider in
deciding whether a particular youth is amenable to treatment, both as a
matter of formal law and in terms of the factors social science research
indicates courts really consider.
A. The Goal of Treatment
The law's foremost concern in determining amenability is whether
intervention will reduce or eliminate recidivism of the offender. The
Kent transfer criteria refer to "[t]he prospects for adequate protection of
the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the
juvenile.., by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently
available to the Juvenile Court."' 6 The general statements of purpose
that one finds in juvenile delinquency jurisprudence even more directly
refer to prevention of recidivism as the overriding goal of treatment.
The National Advisory Committee's provision on the purpose of
"juvenile delinquency disposition" states that dispositions should

13.

By 1987, thirty-nine states had adopted all or a majority of the Kent criteria.

See Beth Wilbourn, Note, Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: National Trends and
the Inadequacy of the Texas Response, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 633, 639 (1996). See also
Royce S. Buckingham, The Erosion of Juvenile Court Judge Discretion in the Transfer
Decision Nationwide and in Oregon, 29 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 689, 694 (1993).
14.
ABA, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, Standards Relating to Juvenile
Delinquency and Sanctions (1980) [hereinafter ABA Standards].
15.
GOALS,

NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY

PREVENTION (1976) [hereinafter NAC Standards].
16.
Kent, 383 U.S. at 567.

"develop individual responsibility for lawful behavior through programs
of reeducation."1 7 State statutes are similar. In Idaho the juvenile code
states "It is the ...primary purpose of this act ... to provide a
continuum of supervision and rehabilitation programs which meet the
needs of the youthful offender in a manner consistent with public
safety." 8 Virginia's statute forthrightly requires juvenile courts "to
reduce the incidence of delinquent behavior.... 9
That protection of society is an important or even the primary goal of
juvenile court treatment is not surprising. A more difficult question is
whether that goal is considered the only goal of juvenile court treatment
interventions. In theory, at least, the answer seems to be no. Note that
the Kent criteria separate protection of society from "reasonable
rehabilitation of the juvenile," suggesting that the latter might subsume
the former and cast beyond it. The ABA Standards on transfer are
similar in tone. They speak only of whether the youth is a "proper
person to be handled by the juvenile court," which requires, inter alia,
assessment of "the likely inefficacy of the dispositions available to the
juvenile court as demonstrated by previous dispositions of the
juvenile." 2 ° The word "inefficacy" is vague enough to encompass more
than a failure to prevent recidivism. The National Advisory Committee
statement, in the sentence immediately following the one quoted in the
previous paragraph, states that reeducation "should be pursued through
means that.., recognize the unique physical, psychological, and social
characteristics and needs of juveniles; and give juveniles access to
opportunities for normal growth and development, while insuring that
such dispositions will: ...[p]rotect society .. . and ...[c]ontribute to
the proper socialization of the juvenile. 21 Those state statutes that refer
to protection of the public also often mention other purposes as well.
Idaho's statute refers to programs that "will individualize treatment and
control the juvenile offender for the benefit of the juvenile and the
protection of society ' 22 and Virginia provides that the ultimate goal of its
family courts is the "welfare of the child. 2 3
17.
NAC Standards, supra note 15, § 14.1.
18.
IDAHO CODE § 16-1801 (1995).
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-227(4) (Michie 1999).
20.
ABA Standards, supra note 14, § 2.2(C)(3).
21.
NAC Standards, supra note 15, § 14.1. Here and elsewhere the drafters of
language about the purpose of juvenile court sometimes seem to have in mind the need
to impose sanctions that will reduce recidivism through general deterrence rather than
specific deterrence and rehabilitation.
22.
IDAHO CODE § 20-501 (1997).
23.
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-227 (Michie 1999). The trend is clearly to make
protection of the public the primary goal of the juvenile court system, however. As one
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Some court decisions echo this more expansive definition of treatment
goals. For instance, in defining amenability to rehabilitation in the
transfer context, a North Dakota court stated that "[r]ehabilitation...
tries to improve the offender's future welfare."2 4 Many other decisions
use similarly global language, often simply discussing whether a youth
is "amenable to treatment... within the juvenile system."25
B. Assessing Treatability
While the law has been somewhat vague as to the purpose of
treatment within the juvenile delinquency context, it has been relatively
specific in delineating factors relevant to deciding whether someone is
treatable. These factors can be divided into seven categories: (1) the
nature of the juvenile's offense, (2) the juvenile's prior record, (3) past
treatment efforts, (4) aspects of the juvenile's environment (family,
school peer and neighborhood) and personality (maturity, sophistication)
that are relevant to treatability, (5) the juvenile's willingness to
participate in treatment, (6) the availability of treatment, and (7) the age
of the juvenile. Not every state requires or suggests consideration of
every one of these factors. But together the factors represent the
universe of issues that juvenile courts are authorized to consider in
determining amenability to treatment.
1. Nature of Current Offense
Most statutes and cases addressing the transfer issue mandate close
attention to the nature of the youth's offense, especially the extent to
which it suggests that the youth threatens public safety. Three of the six
criteria in the Kent appendix that relate to amenability are devoted in
whole or part to this factor: "[t]he seriousness of the alleged offense to
the community and whether the protection of the community requires
example, at one time Minnesota's statute stated that the purpose of the juvenile court was
to "secure for each minor ... care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will
serve the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best
interest of the state." MINN. STAT. § 260.011 subd. 2 (1978). Now the purpose is "to
promote the public safety and reduce juvenile delinquency." MINN. STAT. § 260.011
subd. 2 (1978).
24. Witowski v. M.D.N., 493 N.W.2d 680, 682 (N.D. 1992).
25. See, e.g., T.C. v. State, 740 P.2d 739 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987).

305

waiver... [w]hether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner ... [and] [w]hether the
alleged offense was against persons or against property .... "26 Many
states incorporate this language or a close variant in their transfer
statutes.2 7
Of course, a youth's aggressiveness and willfulness during the offense
and the type of injury caused by the offense have much less to do with
treatability than with culpability and danger to society. Many courts
acknowledge this fact and often frankly base transfer largely on the latter
two grounds.28 Indeed, some courts explicitly ignore the amenability to
treatment issue if the offense is serious enough, 29 a stance which, even if
not contrary to statutory commands,3 ° is completely antithetical to a
rehabilitation-oriented juvenile justice system.
Other decisions,
26.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966).
27. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1636(e) (1993) (identical to Kent factors
discussed in text); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-11-4 (Lexis 1999) (identical to Kent
factors); ARIZ. RULES PROC. JUV. CT. 14(C)(1) & (2) (identical to the Kent factors, with
the addition of "and whether personal injury resulted" to the second factor). See
generally Heilbrun et al., supra note 10, at 128-143 (indicating that at least 22 states
have language similar or identical to the Kent language with respect to offense
seriousness).
28. State v. Garza, 492 N.W.2d 32, 44 (Neb. 1992) ("Rehabilitation has
traditionally played a key role in the treatment of young offenders.... Nevertheless, the
concept of deterrence and the need to balance individual justice with the needs of
society ... also have a place in the juvenile justice system."); In re S.K., a Minor Child,
587 N.W.2d 740, 742-43 (S.D. 1999) (to transfer, judge need only find the juvenile is
nonamenable or a threat to public safety); State v. Duncan, 250 N.W.2d 189, 194 (Minn.
1977); Commonwealth v. Waters, 483 A.2d 855, 858 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (same). But
see A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 347 N.E.2d 677, 685 (Mass. 1976) (error to transfer
solely because of dangerousness).
29. For instance, in Green v. State, 916 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Ark. 1996), the court
stated "[T]he seriousness of an offense, when coupled with the employment of violence,
is a sufficient basis for ... trying a juvenile as an adult." See also State v. Campbell, 598
N.E.2d 1244, 1247 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (despite favorable testimony regarding
amenability, waiver appropriate in light of defendant's age-16---and charge of killing
victim with a baseball bat); In re D.F.B. 433 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1988) (age plus serious
offense permits waiver); Cole v. State, 913 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Ark. 1996) ("[T]he
extreme seriousness of the crimes charged... alone were clear and convincing evidence
which supported the circuit court's decision" to retain adult court jurisdiction).
30. The preamble to the Kent appendix, mimicked in many states, seems to adopt
the position that even clearly treatable youths should be transferred if the offense is
serious enough or transfer is "necessary" to protect the community. It states: "An
offense.., will be waived if it has prosecutive merit and if it is heinous or of an
aggravated character, or 'even though less serious' if it represents a pattern of repeated
offenses which indicate that the juvenile may be beyond rehabilitation under Juvenile
Court procedures, or if the public needs the protection afforded by such action." 383 U.S.
at 566. See also, supra notes 11 & 23.
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however, reflect the view that offense seriousness should be considered
only if relevant to treatment amenability.31 In general, the more serious
the offense, the less likely a youth will be considered amenable to
juvenile court disposition.32
2. PriorOffense History
Obviously related to the nature of the current offense is the nature of
the youth's offense history, if any. The Kent appendix lists as its
seventh variable "[t]he record and previous history of the
juvenile .... ."" The cases consistently look at this factor. Typical is the
statement that, in determining amenability, a court may consider "the
minor's behavior pattern including his past record, if any, of
delinquency, [and] his degree of sophistication[,] especially as the same
may relate to criminal activities .... "" At the same time, most courtsat least most appellate courts-do not probe deeply into offense history.
Rather they either merely list the number of prior offenses or they
evaluate them relatively superficially, without investigating their
precipitants.35
31.
See, e.g., In re Snitzky, 657 N.E.2d 1379, 1384-85 (Ohio Com. Pleas, 1995)
("[C]onsideration of the facts of the crime [are] relevant only to the child's mental and
physical condition, rather than... the concern for a legitimate response to the violent
crime the child has committed"); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 690 A.2d 240 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1997) ("[T]he nature of the conduct will not justify the 'transfer from the juvenile
system without a concomitant finding that the youth was not amenable to treatment as a
juvenile."').
32. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157(5)(1972 & Supp. 1993) (stating that
the "seriousness of the offense" and "danger to the public" should be considered in
determining whether there are "reasonable prospects of rehabilitation"); State v.
Campbell, 598 N.E.2d 1244, 1247 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) ("[I]n determining a juvenile's
amenability to rehabilitation, a juvenile court may consider the nature and seriousness of
the alleged criminal act."). See also Hicks v. Superior Ct., 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269 (Ct.
App. 1995); State ex rel. Lyles, No. JN90-0922, 1994 WL 811742 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1994);
P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837, 842 (Alaska 1972).
33.
383 U.S. at 567.
34.
H. v. Superior Ct., 478 P.2d 32, 36 (Cal. 1970).
35.
See, e.g., In re K.J.K., 357 N.W.2d 117, 119-120 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(transfer held permissible after a brief listing of record); In re T.M., 393 S.E.2d 448, 449
(Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (same); Armer v. State, 773 P.2d 757 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989)
(despite evidence of rehabilitative potential, transfer was permissible where rape had
been forceful and violent and where juvenile had had prior contacts with juvenile system,
some involving inappropriate sexual and violent behavior); MMT v. Dist. Ct., 637 P.2d

3.

Past Treatment

This factor dovetails with offense history; a series of past treatment
efforts usually means a series of offenses. Indeed, the relevant criterion
in the Kent appendix lumps past crimes and past treatment together
under its "record and previous history" rubric; it elaborates by
mentioning "previous contacts with [the local juvenile system], other
law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior
periods of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile
institutions. '"36 As one might expect, a juvenile who has been subject to
juvenile treatment programs in the past and reoffended is less likely to
be found amenable than one who has not undergone any treatment.
Some courts are sensitive to whether any treatment efforts that took
place were meaningful. In M.L.S. v. State,37 for instance, the court noted
that the juvenile had been in contact with the juvenile system on "only"
two previous occasions. Furthermore, the first occasion, resulting from
an allegation that the youth was a child in need of supervision, failed to
provide any services. The second contact was initiated by the youth
himself on a claim that he had been "abandoned," and resulted in a short
stay in the youth shelter before release to his mother. In conjunction
with testimony about treatability, this information led the appellate court
to overturn both the trial court's finding of nonamenability and its
decision to transfer, despite two charges of attempted murder and erratic
behavior while in detention. As is true with offense history, however, a
number of cases suggest that the key issue for courts with respect to this
factor is simply the number of previous "contacts" with the juvenile
system.38
876 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981); D.R.D. v. State, 767 P.2d 207, 211 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989)
(noting that "dangerousness is the converse of amenability to rehabilitation" and that a
person can be "dangerous" simply because of "repeated criminality.").
36. 383 U.S. at 567.
37. 805 P.2d 665 (Okla.Crim. App. 1991).
38. See State v. Harris, 494 N.W.2d 619, 625 (S.D. 1993) ("Neither the statute nor
our decisions have required the court to find that the juvenile unsuccessfully exhausted
the resources of this state's juvenile justice rehabilitation programs prior to transferring
proceedings to adult court."); Commonwealth v. Berry, 648 N.E.2d 732 (Mass. 1995)
(past treatment of juvenile was a failure because juvenile "had been hospitalized with a
diagnosis of conduct disorder [and] drug abuse [and] . .. had been enrolled in a drug
rehabilitation program" yet had reverted to his former antisocial behavior after
treatment); People v. Lyons, 513 N.W.2d 170 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (describing in brief
several failed treatment attempts, most of them aborted by the juvenile's escape); C.H. v.
State, 252 S.E.2d 22, 23 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (listing treatment failures). For an example
of a good effort to evaluate past treatment attempts, see J.A.G. v. Guerrero, 552 N.W.2d
317, 321-22 (N.D. 1996).
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4. Environment and Personality
This factor-itself a constellation of factors-is the most speculative
and subjective of the seven identified here. Evidence concerning this
factor often involves expert testimony from mental health professionals
and other specialists on a variety of psychiatric, familial and social
variables, with the common theme being the extent to which they cast
light on the youth's treatability. The Kent appendix refers to "[t]he
sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude
and pattern of living."39 Ohio's regulations governing amenability
assessments list "the child's age and his mental and physical
condition... [t]he child's family environment; [and] ...school record"
as elements to consider.4 ° Consistent with current "get-tough" attitudes,
other states have de-emphasized assessment of these types of factors.
For instance, Massachusetts' transfer statute requiring assessment of
"the family, school and social history of the child"4 1 was replaced in
1996 with a statute that 42
stresses dangerousness and an undelineated
assessment of amenability.
In an apparent effort to encourage broadscale inquiry into the youth's
functioning, some state statutes also refer to "the probable cause of the
minor's delinquent behavior" as a factor separate from seriousness of the
offense.4 3 Additionally, many states require an assessment of whether
the juvenile either meets the state's test for insanity or, more generally,
should be committed to an institution for those with mental illness or
mental retardation; if so, juvenile jurisdiction is usually retained.'- Not
necessarily inconsistently, some courts consider psychological stability

39.

383 U.S. at 567.

40.

OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. Juv. R. § 30(F)(1)-(5) (Banks-Baldwin 1994).

41.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 119, § 61 (West 1993).
42.
See Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 673 N.E.2d 552, 555 n.2 (Mass. 1996).
43.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060(d) (LEXIS 1998).
44.
ARiz. RULES PROC. JUV. CT., Rule 12(d); S.H. v. State, 555 P.2d 1050 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1976); Ogden v. J.K.M. 557 N.W.2d 229 (N.D. 1996) (more amenable because
suffering from depression). Most states avoid a broad definition of mental illness in this
context, so as to ensure that juveniles with personality disorders are not automatically
retained in juvenile court. See, e.g., In re Appeal in Coconino County, 754 P.2d 1356,
1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) ("Arizona appellate courts have consistently.., excluded
character and personality disorders from the definition of 'mental disorder' [for purposes
of juvenile commitment] ...").

to be a good indicator of treatability.4 5
5.

Willingness

This factor can be considered part of the youth's "personality" and
thus relevant to the previous factor, but it is one that is often separated
out in case law. For instance, many cases refer to the youth's motivation
to be treated as an aspect of the transfer decision,4 6 and others make
much of the juvenile's "remorse" or lack thereof.47 Statutes also
occasionally include a criterion that seems focused on willingness to
undergo treatment. For instance, Alabama's transfer statute includes
"the juvenile's demeanor" as one factor to be considered.4 8 The Kent
appendix's allusion to "emotional attitude" might also function as a
proxy for degree of motivation to change.49
6. Availability
This factor is mentioned in virtually every transfer statute. Most states
echo the language of the Kent appendix, which refers to rehabilitation
"by use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the
Juvenile Court."50 Others seem to be somewhat more vague as to
whether programs have to be "currently available." In Indiana, for
instance, the court must determine that the juvenile "is beyond

45. In re Appeal in Coconino County, 724 P.2d 54, 60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986)
(emphasizing that juvenile was "bright, emotionally stable"); People v. Gregory C., 602
N.Y.S.2d 492, 495 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
46. See, e.g., State v. Mastracchio, 605 A.2d 489, 494 (R.I. 1992) ("no
evidence.., that defendant would have cooperated with or would have been receptive to
rehabilitation efforts."); D.R.D. v. State, 767 P.2d 207, 210 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989)
("uncertainty regarding D.R.D.'s motivation" one factor leading to affirmance of waiver
order); State v. Hambel, 1994 WL 371348 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Ward v.
Commonwealth, 554 N.E.2d 25 (Mass. 1990).
47.
Commonwealth v. Morningwake, 595 A.2d 158, 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(juvenile offered no justification for action; merely blamed others); Commonwealth v.
McDonald, 582 A.2d 328, 335 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (despite no prior treatment, transfer
justified because the offense was committed with "extreme callousness"); In re Appeal
in Coconino County, Juv. Action No. J-9896, 724 P.2d 54, 60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (in
denying transfer, emphasizing that there was "no question Appellant had shown remorse
with respect to her criminal conduct ... ").
48.
ALA. CODE § 12-15-34(d)(4) (Supp. 1998).
49. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 541, 567 (1966).
50. Id. at 567. See Heilbrun et al., supra note 10, at 128-143 (listing over 25 states
that use such language).
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rehabilitation under the juvenile justice system."'" Regardless of how
the availability issue is framed, however, lack of programs, 52 or at least
lack of programs that are easily accessible,53 is often the primary reason
for transfer.
Some courts also state that the chance that rehabilitation will be even
less likely in the adult court system is irrelevant in making the transfer
decision.5 4 To these courts, transfer is permissible whenever a viable
treatment is not available in the juvenile system even if what is available
in the juvenile system is "better" (i.e., will do less harm) than anything
the adult system has to offer. Other courts have granted transfer based
on a finding that rehabilitation is more likely in the adult system.5 5

51.

IND. CODE ANN.

§ 31-6-2-1.5 (Michie 1997). See also R.C. § 2151.26(A)

(c)(i) (requiring the court to find that the juvenile "is not amenable to care or
rehabilitation.., in any facility designed for the care, supervision, and rehabilitation of
delinquent children").
52.
State v. Simpson, 836 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (transfer of 14-year old
permissible because juvenile rehabilitation authorities testified that they lacked adequate
facilities to deal with a 14-year-old homicide offender); Commonwealth v. Cessna, 537
A.2d 834 (Pa. 1988) (juvenile did not show that there was a juvenile facility that would
accept him); In re R.M., 648 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (no programs to treat
juvenile who became violent when he consumed alcohol). The most dramatic effect
unavailability can have is illustrated by Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781
(Ky. 1987). There the court rejected the juvenile's argument that "the state has an
obligation not to execute a juvenile who is deemed to be amenable to treatment but for
whom the state offers no appropriate treatment program." Id. at 792.
53.
Courts sometimes refuse to look beyond their immediate locale, and rarely
examine alternatives outside the state. See, e.g., Dillard v. State, 623 P.2d 1294 (Idaho
1981) (transfer permissible because contract with California to provide juvenile
treatment had expired and there were no placement contracts with other states); P.K.M.
v. State, 780 P.2d 395, 399 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (no obligation to look beyond state
borders).
54.
State v. J.D.S., 723 P.2d 1278, 1279 (Alaska, 1986) (improper for waiver court
to compare chances of being rehabilitated in juvenile court with chances of being
rehabilitated if treated as an adult; waiver should have been granted); People v. Allgood,
126 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Ct. App. 1976) (same). Cf. People v. Joe T., 121 Cal. Rptr. 329, 332
(Ct. App. 1975) (holding invalid a waiver based on referee's determination that
sentencing alternatives in adult court "would be better suited for appellant than the local
treatment programs available through the juvenile court.").
55.
State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. George, 862 P.2d 531 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); In re
Appeal in Pima County, 527 P.2d 104 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (transfer permissible when
no juvenile facilities are available).

7. Age
Even if a treatment program is "available" in the sense that it exists
within the jurisdiction, it may not be available to a particular youth
because of the time necessary for treatment to be effective. Every state
age-limits the dispositional jurisdiction of the juvenile court (to either 18
or some age between 19 and 25).56 Accordingly, numerous decisions
find a juvenile unamenable to treatment, despite a possibility that
treatment will work, because the treatment regimen cannot be completed
by the requisite age.57
Thus, one court distinguished between
"treatment" (which refers to any interventions that can help the youth)
and "rehabilitation" (which refers only to those interventions that can
help the youth by the time juvenile jurisdiction lapses).58 Using this
terminology, if a treatment program cannot "rehabilitate" the youth, it is,
in a real sense, "unavailable" in the juvenile system.
C. Research on the "Reality" of Transfer Decisions
A number of studies explore the characteristics of cases that result in
transfer to the adult system. Some of these studies look at the reasons
courts explicitly give for transferring a juvenile, while most
independently code variables that correlate with a transfer decision. One
review of 36 of these studies indicated that the most important factors in
the transfer decision are the seriousness of the offense, prior record, the
results of previous treatment efforts, and age (i.e., the first three factors
and the last factor of the seven identified above).59 A General
Accounting Office survey of prosecutorial reasons for recommending
transfer also identified these four factors as the most important.6 °
56.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 15 (1996).

57. In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 674 P.2d 841, 845 (Ariz. 1983) (1 1/2 years
not long enough to effect rehabilitation); G.B.K. v. State, 376 N.W.2d 385 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1985) (expert testimony that juvenile needed a minimum of two years of treatment
and that only 26 months remained in juvenile court jurisdiction justified transfer); In re
A.B., 520 A.2d 783 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Commonwealth v. Leatherbury,
568 A.2d 1313 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); In re T.M., 393 S.E.2d 448 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990);
D.E.P. v. State, 727 P.2d 800 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
58. Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 673 N.E.2d 552 (Mass. 1996).
59.

JAMES C. HOWELL, JUVENILE JUSTICE & YOUTH VIOLENCE 98 (1997); see also,

DONNA M. HAMPARIAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS: BETWEEN TWO WORLDS (1982).

60. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE: JUVENILES PROCESSED IN
CRIMINAL COURT AND CASE DISPOSITIONS (1995). Other factors that were not considered
as important were "family background of the offender"; "sophistication and maturity of
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Research also indicates that gender is a significant factor (with males
being transferred more often), and a few studies indicate that race plays
a disproportionate role in the transfer decision (with African-Americans
being most likely to be transferred), 6 1 although other studies find no
relationship between race and transfer.62
Social science research thus identifies six factors that appear to be
important in amenability determinations. With respect to three of these
factors-offense seriousness, prior record, and age-these data largely
support the description of judicial decisionmaking already given. The
studies show that courts usually gauge offense seriousness by whether it
involved violence, use of a weapon, or an exhibition of maliciousness
(although the research also seems to show that drug offenses are now
considered "serious" by many courts).63

Prior offense history usually

involves consideration of little else beyond the number of juvenile court
adjudications and the number of transfers to adult court. 4 Finally, the
the offender"; "the availability of more serious punishments in criminal court"; "the
availability of a youthful offender facility"; "the need to protect the community"; and
"prosecutive merits of complaint".
61.
Edward W. McNulty, The Transfer of Juvenile Offenders to Adult Court:
Panacea or Problem? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of
Criminology, Boston (1995); OHIO DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES, JUVENILES
TRANSFERRED TO ADULT COURT IN OHIO, FISCAL YEAR 1992 (1993); Rob Roy & Carl
Sagan, Juvenile Bindovers in Massachusetts (unpublished, 1980).
Jeffrey Fagan et al., Racial Determinants of the Judicial Transfer Decision:
62.
Prosecuting Violent Youth in Criminal Court, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 259 (1987) (race a
determining factor only in homicide cases); Tammy M. Poulos & Stan Orchowsky,
Serious Juvenile Offenders: Predictingthe Probabilityof Transfer to Criminal Cour 40
CRIME & DELINQ. 3 (1994) (race not a factor); Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 6, at 481
(in a comprehensive study of 330 judicial waiver decisions, race found not to be an
important factor).
In 1989, the majority of juveniles convicted in adult court after transfer
63.
committed property crimes (41%) and drug crimes (15%). MICHAEL A. JONES & BARRY
KRISBERG, IMAGES AND REALITY: JUVENILE CRIME, YOUTH VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC
POLICY 33, fig. 16 (1994). A number of other studies indicate that property offenses are
the predominant offense among transferred juveniles. See DEAN J. CHAMPION & G.
LARRY MAYS, TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO CRIMINAL COURTS: TRENDS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 77 (1991). But this finding is likely best explained
as a judicial desire to transfer recidivists rather than the result of a determination that
property crimes are "serious." Id
Research shows a very high correlation between past offenses and transfer.
64.
See, e.g., HOWARD N. SNYDER & JOHN L. HUTZLER, NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE
THE SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDER: THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE OF
JUVENILE COURTS (1981) (prior record was a better predictor of juvenile court
dispositions than any other variable; about 60% of those violent offenders with more

research verifies that, although youths aged 16 and over are much more
likely to be transferred, the transfer decision is usually not based on age
per se, but on the fact that insufficient time exists in which to
"rehabilitate" the juvenile. For instance, one study found that a
nonamenability determination was three times as likely in courts with
jurisdiction of youths up to ages eighteen or nineteen than in courts that
had extended jurisdiction until the twenty-first birthday, and four times
the rate of those courts that could retain jurisdiction past the twenty-first
birthday.65
Conversely, the research findings about two other factors that may
influence transfer-race and gender--contrast with the courts' silence
about these factors. Of course this silence is not surprising. To the
extent the research is correct that race and gender are independent
variables, courts may not even be conscious of their effect.66
Less clear is what the research indicates with respect to the last factor
it identifies as important to transfer-past treatment history. According
to some studies, courts merely look at the number of (failed) treatment
attempts, 67 whereas according to other studies courts examine
recommendations of staff, previous mental health treatment, available
programs, or a combination thereof.68 A related point is that the type of
research reported here inevitably relies on "codable" factors. Highly
variable psychological and environmental considerations, including
degree of remorse, are much harder to discern and code than
demographic characteristics, seriousness of the offense, prior offenses,
than two prior referrals were waived or incarcerated and 35% of serious property
offenders with more than two prior referrals were waived or incarcerated).
65.
ELLEN NIMICK ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURT
WAIVER: A STUDY OF JUVENILE COURT CASES TRANSFERRED TO CRIMINAL COURT
(1986); see also, SNYDER & HUTZLER, supra note 64. Age may also play another role in

the transfer decision. One study found that youths who started their delinquent careers at
a relatively young age were more likely to be transferred. Fagan et al., supra note 62, at
275-76.
66.

But see BARRY KRISBERG & JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE

129 (1993) ("One judge admitted that when he adjudicates a black youth he views that
youth very differently from other youth even if the youth is charged with a similar
offense. Specifically, black males are seen as less controllable and with limited family
support if returned to the community.").
67.
See NIMICK ET AL., supra note 65 (waived juveniles tend to have a large
number of prior referrals and an early age of onset; more than two-thirds of those waived
had five or more court referrals); JAMES P. HEUSER, OR. DEP'T OF JUSTICE CRIME
ANALYSIS CTR., JUVENILES ARRESTED FOR SERIOUS FELONY CRIMES IN OREGON AND

"REMANDED" TO ADULT CRIMINAL COURTS: A STATISTICAL STUDY (1985) (waived cases

were generally older with an extensive juvenile court referral history).
68.
See HOWELL, supra note 59, at 98 (this variable "involves a complex
determination reflecting a wide range of considerations").
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or number of treatment failures. In short, although the research suggests
that current offense, offense history, treatment history and age in relation
to dispositional jurisdiction are most important to the amenability
determination, personality and environment, willingness to undergo
treatment, and availability of treatment facilities may play significant
roles as well.
III. ANALYZING THE LAW'S APPROACH TO AMENABILITY
DETERMINATIONS
Part II discussed the possible purposes of the amenability
determination and set out the amenability criteria established by statutes
and judicial decisions. It also suggested, based on a survey of the
caselaw and social science research identifying correlates of treatability
determinations, that courts are applying the amenability criteria with
some regularity if not with interpretive consistency, This part of the
article examines the appropriateness of both the avowed purposes of the
amenability determination and the legal criteria used to make that
determination. It also looks at the legal and practical obstacles to
obtaining information about these factors.
A. The Goal of Treatment
Part II noted that some statutes and cases are vague as to whether one
of the goals of the juvenile system is treatment aimed at improving the
general welfare of the juvenile, beyond that necessary to prevent
recidivism. An issue of possibly constitutional proportions is whether
government has the authority to coerce such expanded treatment. Under
traditional civil commitment theory, for instance, the state may intervene
coercively in the lives of those with mental illness to prevent danger to
self or others, but not "to ensure them a living standard superior to that
they enjoy in the private community." 69
To this theoretical observation can be added an empirical one. Metaanalyses of large numbers of juvenile treatment programs have found
that the treatments most likely to "work" in terms of reducing recidivism
have three attributes: (1) the interventions are applied primarily to high-

69.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
further in Slobogin et al., supra note 8, at 191-92.

This point is developed

risk (i.e., relatively dangerous) individuals; (2) targets of treatment are
criminogenic factors (e.g., antisocial attitudes or peer relationships,
criminal role models, lack of prosocial skill development) rather than
vague personal/emotional problems (e.g., poor self-esteem); and (3) the
interventions focus on developing skills that offenders are capable of
applying rather than "nondirective" or "insight" approaches. 70 All three
of these attributes, and particularly the first two, suggest that treatment
programs are least likely to be effective at reducing recidivism if they
aim merely at improving the self-concept of the youth or in some other
vague way are designed to "help." Intervention is most likely to be
successful if its goal is straightforward reduction of identified
precipitants of recidivism among the most dangerous.
These theoretical and practical points should lead to the conclusion
that juvenile court treatment ought to focus forthrightly on preventing
recidivism, not on improving the juvenile generally. At the same time, a
system triggered solely by a desire to reduce recidivism may run afoul of
other philosophical principles. In Kansas v. Hendricks,7 1 the Supreme
Court held that the government may incarcerate an individual on
dangerousness grounds alone if it shows that the individual is suffering
from a "mental abnormality" that reduces the ability to control behavior.
Imposing criminalpunishment solely on the grounds of dangerousness is
still anathema, however. In light of In re Gault2 and the more adult-like
system that has followed in its wake, juvenile court disposition today is
probably most accurately viewed as punishment, which means that
imposition of a treatment intervention should be limited to those youths
who have committed culpable criminal acts. In other words, even a
youth who is likely to commit crime and can be successfully "treated"
should not be found "amenable to treatment" and subject to juvenile
court jurisdiction without proof of an act that merits punishment.73

70. D. A. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically
Relevant and PsychologicallyInformed Meta-Analysis, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 369 (1990); see
also Mark W. Lipsey, Juvenile Delinquency Treatment: A Meta-Analytic Inquiry Into the
Variability of Effects, in META-ANALYSIS FOR EXPLANATION 83 (Thomas D. Cook et al.
eds., 1992).
71.
521 U.S. 346, 356-57(1997).
72.
387 U.S. 1 (1967) (imposing adult procedures on the juvenile court process).
73. Even if juvenile court disposition is not viewed as punishment, a position taken
in Slobogin et al., supra note 8, at 196-200, proof of a threshold act should be required
for utilitarian reasons. Id. at 205-06.
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B. A CriticalAnalysis of the Amenability Factors
For the theoretical and practical reasons just discussed, the
rehabilitative reach of the juvenile system should be limited. The
amenability issue of most concern to policymakers, however, arises in
those cases in which the juvenile system clearly does have jurisdiction.
Based on a survey of statutes, caselaw and field research, Part II
identified eight factors the courts might consider in this regard: (1)
seriousness of the offense; (2) offense history; (3) treatment history; (4)
environmental and personality factors; (5) willingness to be treated; (6)
availability of treatment; (7) age; and (8) race and gender. Each is
analyzed critically below.
1. Offense Seriousness
Intuitively and empirically, the nature of the offense in the abstract
bears no relationship to treatability. Youths who commit homicide are
not per se less amenable to treatment than youths who commit burglary
or possess drugs. Research indicates that one of the best predictors of
violence for ages twelve to twenty-five is early antisocial behavior of
74
virtually any type (including temper tantrums and verbal aggression).
Thus, offense seriousness may well bear no relationship or even a
negative relationship to treatability.
Perhaps recognizing this possibility, many courts go beyond the
offense on its face and delve into the manner in which it was committed.
As Part II indicated, they may look at the youth's motives in committing
the crime, the degree of maliciousness, whether it was part of a group
action, and so on. Part II also noted, however, that courts' analysis of
the offense is often superficial. Furthermore, the sense one gets from
these cases (a sense that is not dissipated by the significant increase in
automatic transfer statutes based entirely on the nature of the offense) is
that the real purpose behind the courts' offense analysis is assessment of
culpability, not of treatability. Again, the former bears no necessary
relationship to the latter.
The nature of the offense is relevant to treatability only if a truly
74.

Mark W. Lipsey & J.H. Drezon, Predictors of Serious Delinquency in

Adolescence and Early Adulthood, in SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS: RISK

FACTORS AND SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTIONS (Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds.,

1998).

"anamnestic" approach to prediction is taken. 5 It is well-established
that assessing dangerousness based on diagnosis or actuarial data is of
limited utility without an individualized assessment of offense patterns.76
Similarly, discerning whether antisocial behavior can be curbed through
treatment requires exploring
in detail the particular themes of the
77
individual's misconduct.
2. Past Offenses
As noted earlier, courts give the nature of past offenses even shorter
shrift than the nature of the current offense. Yet just as the current
offense must be analyzed in depth, so should past offenses be examined
for clues as to treatability. It is a truism that the best predictor of future
acts is past acts.78 Incisive analysis of past acts for risk factors will
suggest whether and how treatment will succeed.
Also noted earlier was the fact that courts sometimes seem satisfied
merely with counting up the number of offenses and finding the frequent
recidivist to be nonamenable. Certainly a relationship exists between
number of past offenses and reoffending. 79 But courts also need to take
into account whether treatment interventions occurred after any of the
past offenses and, if so, how effective they were. If past offenses did not
trigger meaningful treatment, or ended in diversion out of the system,
then they should ordinarily not weigh heavily in the amenability
determination. All that is shown by a long history of untreated previous
offenses is that, left untreated, the youth reoffends.
3. Past Treatment Attempts
If courts considered this factor seriously, then the problem just
75. This approach, described further in the text, was championed by Morris and
Mills. See Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness,6 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 13-14 (1985).
76.
MELTON ET AL., supra note 9, at 290; JOHN MONAHAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 85-90

(1981).
77. See Ivan P. Kruh & Stanley L. Brodsky, Clinical Evaluationsfor Transfer of
Juveniles to Criminal Court: Current Practices and Future Research, 15 BEHAv. SCI. &
L. 151, 156 (1997) (evaluation must include "examination of the situational details of the
crime.").
78. JOHN MONAHAN, supra note 76, at 71.
79. Id. ("If there is one finding that overshadows all others in the area of
prediction, it is that the probability of future crime increases with each prior criminal
act.").
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described would be avoided. Yet, as noted earlier, many courts handle
this factor the way they do prior offense history; if there are a large
number of past treatment attempts, the juvenile must be unamenable.
The reality is that the match between a youth's problems and treatment
programs is not always felicitous and can often be improved upon;
unfortunately, effective treatment often requires trial and error.8 °
Ideally, courts would examine the precise type of treatment provided in
the past to ascertain whether the proper treatment course was utilized
and, if so, whether it was effectively implemented.
4. Personalityand Environment
This factor is the crux of the amenability determination. Offense and
treatment history are in reality only a part, albeit a significant part, of an
assessment of the youth's personality and environment. The overall
inquiry should be focused on the individual's potential for "risk
management," a concept developed by Monahan and Steadman. 8 1 Risk
management involves identifying "dynamic"8 2 risk factors-that is,
potentially modifiable characteristics or influences that correlate with a
risk of recidivism-and developing a method of managing those
characteristics and influences.
Research has identified several dynamic risk factors. Beginning with
the more endogenous factors and moving to the more exogenous ones,
they include: (1) anger, impulsivity, risky behavior, lack of empathy,
lack of commitment to school, mental disorder; (2) familial conflict, lack
of family bonding; (3) poor school or occupational environment, gang
membership; (4) availability of psychoactive substances and guns; and
(5) poverty-stricken, run-down community setting.83 State statutes and
caselaw mention only a few of these factors specifically (e.g., school and
family). However, the relevant language from the Kent appendix"[t]he sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by
80.
Even for something as straightforward as antipsychotic medication, up to six
weeks may be necessary before the appropriate titration is found.
AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, PSYCHIATRY FOR MEDICAL STUDENTS (1984).
81,
JOHN MONAHAN & HENRY J. STEADMAN, VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER:
DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT (1994).

82. Dynamic risk factors are to be contrasted with static risk factors, e.g., gender
and prior offenses, that are not subject to modification.
83.
THOMAS GRisso, FORENSIC EVALUATIONS OF JUVENILES 133-49 (1998)
(describing risk factors).

consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude
and pattern of living"---is sufficiently broad that it could be said to
cover all of them.
This is not the place to elaborate on these risk factors or comment on
the types of interventions that might have an impact on them. That
discussion is largely clinical in nature. 85 However, judicial consideration
of these risk factors does raise one important conceptual issue. The Kent
language, mimicked by many state transfer statutes and judicial
decisions, 86 makes the youth's "sophistication and maturity" the focal
point of the personality inquiry. Why are these latter two factors
considered so integral to the amenability determination?
One possible answer to this question is that sophistication and
maturity are thought to be inversely related to malleability and
treatability. But the "street-hardened" youth, "old beyond his years," is
not necessarily a bad candidate for treatment. For instance, such a
youth, despite his maturity, may still be impulsive and unable to
empathize, features which may be treatable. Alternatively, the "mature"
label, especially when attached to one who is sixteen or seventeen, might
simply be another way for the courts to determine that the youth is too
old to treat, given the time available in the juvenile system. As
developed below, however, the relationship of age to the juvenile
system's dispositional jurisdiction should be of minimal importance, at
least if a thorough assessment of treatability is the goal.87
A third (and, perhaps, the most likely) reason courts focus on maturity
is that, just as with offense seriousness, maturity provides a way of
integrating a responsibility determination into the calculus.88 Some of
the original proponents of an independent juvenile system justified it not
just on rehabilitative grounds but also on the theory that young people
are, as a developmental matter, less culpable for their acts. 89 If the latter
84.
383 U.S. at 567.
85. See GRIsso, supra note 83; Kruh & Brodsky, supra note 77.
86. See Heilbrun, supra note 10, at 128-43 (indicating that at least five states use
this type of language); see also KAN. STAT. Ann. § 38-1636(e)(6) (1993 & Supp. 1997);
State v. Buelow, 587 A.2d 948, 953 (Vt. 1990) (indicating that "maturity of the
individual" is a relevant factor).
87. See infra text accompanying note 110.
88. See, e.g., In re B.M.R. v. State, 581 P.2d 1322 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978)
(emphasizing youth's sophistication and maturity and the cold, calculated manner in
which the offense was planned).
89.
See THE INVENTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT, supra note 1, at 550-53; cf.
Hazard, The Jurisprudenceof Juvenile Deviance, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 3

(Margaret K. Rosenheim ed., 1976) (speaking of the "uncertainty about whether young
persons should be held fully responsible for their conduct when they violate the criminal
law."). For a modem version of this rationale, see Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso,
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is the dominant jurisprudential underpinning of juvenile court, then
maturity, defined in terms of culpability, should be a primary criterion
for transfer to adult court and perhaps for a more punitive disposition in
the juvenile system as well. To the extent treatability rather than
culpability is the linchpin of the system, however, maturity is only
distantly relevant, as a (misleading) way of describing youth for whom
treatable risk factors cannot be identified.
5. Willingness

The psychology literature strongly suggests that treatability is related
to one's willingness to be treated.9 ° Certainly "talk" therapies depend
upon cooperation, but even some forms of organic therapy may do best
with a positive attitude.9 1 Thus, courts should consider this variable in
determining amenability. At least two obstacles might prevent them
from doing so, however.
The first is the child him or herself. Consider this description of the
typical juvenile charged with delinquency:
[While] adult defendants often wish to appear "sick" in the hope of facilitating
less aversive dispositions of their cases, adolescents almost never adopt such a
stance....
[A] far more common problem is that juveniles "clam up," or,
alternatively, try to present themselves as streetwise "tough guys," lest clinicians
conclude that they are crazy [or weak]. For many adolescents, including those
whose misbehavior is more neurotic or impulsive than characterological, the label
of "delinquent" or "troublemaker" is less threatening to their self-esteem than
being considered "crazy" or "weird. 92

Accordingly, an admission of a need for treatment may be difficult
even for juveniles who think they need aid. In light of these realities,
judges and clinicians should take special pains to distinguish between an
The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform,
88 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 138 (1997).
90. Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction
Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REv. 15, 46 & 52 n.121 et seq. (1991) ("the
potential for successful treatments in many contexts increases when the individual
accepts treatments voluntarily rather than through coercion," citing research supporting
the value of choice, voluntarism, and involvement with constructing treatment plans).
91.
See id. at 50 ("It has also been suggested that medical and mental health
treatment are more effective when provided on a voluntary rather than involuntary
basis.") & n. 118 (citing literature).

92.

MELTON ET AL.,

supra note 9, at 429 (footnote omitted).

unwillingness to seek help and an unwillingness to be labelled sick.
"Face-saving" mechanisms should be developed to facilitate a youth's
admission that help is needed.
Juveniles may also be unwilling to cooperate because they don't trust
the system. Perhaps they've been through "youth programs" before and
found them lacking in benefit. Or perhaps they feel abused by a system
that doesn't treat them with dignity.93 Finally, in cases not involving
serious violence, they may reason that a finding of amenability will
ultimately lead to greater intrusion and disruption than the opposite
finding. Again, courts should be aware of these multiple and sometimes
conflicting motivations.
A second obstacle to obtaining information about willingness to be
treated is constitutional in origin. Admitting that one wants to cooperate
and is remorseful strongly implies, if it does not require, an admission of
guilt. Because many amenability determinations (including transfer)
take place prior to the adjudicatory hearing, this factor could run afoul of
the Fifth Amendment, which In Re Gault held is applicable to
delinquency proceedings.94 Indeed, a few courts have relied on that
constitutional provision in expressly prohibiting a finding of
nonamenability based in whole or part on consideration of a juvenile's
unwillingness to cooperate during a psychological evaluation. 95 One
possible solution to this problem is to bar subsequent use of information
Indeed, without such protection,
obtained for transfer purposes.
obtaining any of the personal information that is important to
assessments of treatability may be impossible in some cases.
6. Availability of Resources
The paucity of specialized treatment programs (e.g., for substance
abuse) often makes this factor the dispositive one. The simple fact is
that, if no intervention is available, a treatable youth may be found
unamenable to treatment. This reality raises an issue usually avoided by
the courts: is there an obligation to create services that don't exist?
Although some courts have been willing to contemplate such an

93.
WILLIAM AYERS, A KIND AND JUST PARENT 29 (1997) (describing the Cook
County Juvenile Court, where at any given moment 1500 to 2000 cases are pending and
the average time given to any case is 12 minutes, with the typical judge making one
hundred decisions a day).
94. 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
95. In Interest of Bruno, 388 So.2d 784 (La. 1980); In re Appeal in Pima County,
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
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argument,96 most are likely to give this question a negative answer.97
First, as a jurisprudential matter, juveniles have no "right" to juvenile
court disposition in the first place. 98 That being the case, courts reason,
no specific treatment program need be provided. In addition, courts are
of public monies, a matter
naturally reluctant to force appropriation
99
more appropriately left to legislatures.
Nonetheless, a strong argument can be made that some judicial
activism is warranted in this regard. In the related mental health context,
96. In Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia stated:
We do not find it necessary to determine the difficult question whether the
statutory promise of non-criminal treatment in all but exceptional circumstances
may be denied the juvenile because of the lack of adequate facilities. We well
recognize the undeniable limitations upon the resources available to the Juvenile
Court. On the other hand, we also cannot ignore the mockery of a benevolent
statute unbacked by adequate facilities. And to the extent that a juvenile with
more affluent parents might avoid waiver because of the availability of privatelyfinanced treatment and rehabilitation, constitutional issues may lurk in the
problem.
Id. at 1280. See also, Welfare of C. v. State, 225 N.W.2d 245 (Minn. 1975) (remanding
for a determination as to whether, if no treatment program for the juvenile was available,
it was feasible to put together such a program and, if so, why the Department had failed
to do so).
97. A number of courts have recognized a "right to treatment." But these cases
only enforce the right to the extent necessary to abort abusive practices and require
fundamental services. See, e.g., Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977);
Pena v. N.Y. State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Inmates of Boys'
Training Sch. v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972); Morales v. Turman, 364 F.
Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973).
98. State v. A.L. 638 A.2d 814, 818 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) ("Since
statutes governing transfer from juvenile court do not involve a fundamental right or
suspect classification, they survive challenges based on due process or equal protection
grounds if they are not arbitrary and bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state
interest."); Lane v. Jones, 257 S.E.2d 525, 526-27 (Ga. 1979) (treatment as a juvenile is
not an inherent right, but one granted by the legislature, which may restrict or qualify
that right in any rational way it so chooses); State v. Martin, 530 N.W.2d 420 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1995) (same); Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 869 (1973) (same); cf. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 428 (1974)
(upholding exclusion of addicts with two or more felony convictions from discretionary
rehabilitation under Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966 because reasonable for
Congress to conclude that defendants with prior felonies would be less treatable).
99. Cf Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781, 792 (Ky. 1987) (refusing to
reverse death sentence in face of claim that juvenile was theoretically amenable to
treatment, on the theory that the defendant "already had all the treatment the
Commonwealth can provide.").

the Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg v. Romeo"° held that the
state owes a duty to treat if the professional consensus is that treatment
is necessary to protect the safety of a patient or avoid bodily restraint;
the Court also intimated that the state owes a duty to provide treatment
that will "lead to freedom.'O' Transposed to the juvenile setting,
Youngberg might mandate treatment that obviates the need for pure
incapacitation.1 °2 Stated another way, government must accomplish its
aim (prevention of recidivism) in the least restrictive manner possible, at
least when deprivation of liberty is concerned. 0 3
A second, quite different legal issue assumes the availability of
treatment programs but questions the authority of the legal system to
For instance, although courts certainly can require
order them.
delinquent youths to undergo treatment in state-funded programs, the
state's authority to force private agencies to accept such youths is
unclear.' 4
Another jurisdictional concern involves the authority of the court to
take steps designed to reduce exogenous risk factors, i.e., those
associated with third parties. Some of the most effective treatment
programs, involving "multi-systemic" approaches, require participation
of family, peers, schools, employers and others to be effective. 0 5 Yet
100.

457 U.S. 307 (1982).

101.

Id. at 318.

102. This argument is particularly strong if the juvenile court is reconceptualized as
a preventive regime, with disposition based on dangerousness, rather than a punitive
regime, in which dispositions are based on backward-looking assessments of
blameworthiness and thus are determinate and independent of treatability. See Slobogin
et al., supra note 8, at 212-13.
103. See Roy G. Spece, Jr., Preserving the Right to Treatment: A Critical
Assessment and Constructive Development of Constitutional Right to Treatment
Theories, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 33-46 (1978).
104. Cf.Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Stoutamire, 602 So.2d
564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (permitting a court to order a private facility to accept a
patient but emphasizing that the decision "should be construed narrowly and employed
as precedent only with extreme caution.").
105. See generally SCOTr W. HENGGELER & CHARLES M. BORDUIN, FAMILY
THERAPY AND BEYOND: A MULTISYSTEMIC APPROACH TO TREATING THE BEHAVIOR

PROBLEMS OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS

(1990)

(describing an approach that

significantly reduced recidivism through "daily or weekly effort by family members,"
and development of ongoing supports in the extended family and community). See also
Devon D. Brewer et al., Preventing Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offending: A
Review of Evaluations of Selected Strategies in Childhood, Adolescence, and the
Community, in SERIOUS, VIOLENT, & CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDING: A SOURCEBOOK 61,
69 (James G. Howell et al. eds., 1995) (describing three groups of interventions

involving schools (including classroom organization, management, and instructional
strategies and peer counseling); families (including parent training, marital/family
therapy, and mentoring); and community-level interventions (including community laws
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the typical state statute grants the juvenile court specific power only to
order the parents of a delinquent youth into therapy. 0 6 Even in that
context the basis of the state's power to force participation in the
treatment of another is not clear. One might argue, for instance, that
before such coercive intervention may occur evidence that the third party
not only was a "cause" of, but was also "responsible" for, the youth's
problems should be required."° When the third party the court wishes to
involve in the treatment plan is someone other than a family member
(e.g., school classmates, gang members, other community members) the
"responsibility" link is even more tenuous. At the least, without explicit
legislative authorization, court-ordered intervention becomes progressively less viable the further it ventures from the individual-centered
medical model of treatment.l18
Dealing with the most pervasive risk factors (e.g., availability of drugs
and guns; community poverty) does not involve coercing third parties
into treatment programs. But their very pervasiveness makes them less
susceptible to judicial control as well. This institutional infirmity again
argues for a legislative approach to the problem, an approach that can be
brought closer to fruition with strong social science evidence linking
these types of factors to recidivism.' 9

and policies related to weapons, policing strategies, and community mobilization).
106. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.8(3) (Michie 1995). A number of
experimental programs have encountered difficulties enrolling parents of high risk youth.
Karol L. Kumpfer & Charles W. Turner, The Social Ecology Model of Adolescent
SubstanceAbuse: Implicationsfor Prevention, 25 INT'L J. ADDICTIONS 435 (1990-9 1).

107. At common law, parents were not liable for the torts of their children. Today
in virtually every state they may be liable for the wilful and wanton acts of their children,
but not for negligent acts. SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
108 (2d. ed. 1997).
108.
The medical model of treatment can be distinguished from the "psychologic"
and "social" models, which conceptualize behavioral problems in more contextual terms.
See generally Paul Lazare, Hidden ConceptualModels in Clinical Psychiatry, 288 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 345 (1973), described in RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND MENTAL
HEALTH: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 5-6 (3d ed. 1998).
109.
Cf Carolyn R. Block & Richard Block, Street Gang Crime In Chicago,

National Institute of Justice Research in Brief, December 1993, at 1, 7 (increase in
lethality the result of higher calibre, automatic weaponry); Franklin E. Zimring, Street
Crime and New Guns: Some Implications for Firearms Control, 4 J. CRIM. JUST. 95

(1976).

7. Age
If amenability to treatment is to be taken seriously, age, by itself,
should not be a dispositive factor. Yet the research reported earlier
suggests that it is, at least in jurisdictions that end dispositional
jurisdiction at eighteen or nineteen. A seventeen-year-old juvenile who
is amenable to treatment should not be found "nonamenable" simply
because he or she is only three months away from the critical next
birthday. As many states recognize, 1 0 extending dispositional age
jurisdiction to twenty-one or beyond (and allowing juveniles tried as
adults to be sentenced as juveniles) makes sense in a system that is
treatment-oriented. The central question, which is moral as well as
empirical, is at what age (if any) considerations of culpability and
societal desire for punishment outweigh the relatively greater treatability
we assume is associated with youth. In other words, at what stage of an
individual's development are we willing to give up a rehabilitative focus
to the crime problem? It is not clear that age eighteen, age twenty-one
or any other particular age is the right answer to this question; perhaps
treatability should remain a consideration far beyond the age of eighteen.
8.

Race and Gender

No proven correlation exists between a particular race or gender and
untreatability.
Even if such correlation existed, equal protection
concerns would probably bar explicit reliance on this factor.1 '
Furthermore, regardless of constitutional considerations, the need to
individualize amenability determinations makes these factors of
questionable relevance. The various factors laid out above should be
assessed for each individual, of whatever race and gender.
None of these points should suggest that courts and clinicians
evaluating amenability should ignore the possible effects of race and
gender, or of other demographic attributes.
Cultural and ethnic
influences may help explain antisocial behavior and point toward

110.
Since 1992, eleven states and the District of Columbia have extended the age
for juvenile commitments, three of them to 25 years, and four of them indefinitely (until
all orders have been complied with or the term of commitment has been served). U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 15 (1996). At least 16 states have some form of
"blended" sentencing, combining juvenile and court act and/or dispositional jurisdiction.
Id. at xiii.
111.
Terence P. Thornberry, Sentencing Disparities in the Juvenile Justice System,
70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 164 (1979).

[Vol. 10: 299, 1999]

Treating Kids Right
THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES

specific types of interventions. 112 They may also affect the assessment
process itself. For example, experience with and myths about the white
power structure might make minority males particularly unwilling to
explain their behavior to those in authority." 3 If so, both the anamnestic
approach and the assessment of willingness to undergo treatment will be
more difficult. Courts and professionals should be especially careful in
evaluating such cases.
IV. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing discussion suggests a number of research agendas.
Some of these agendas might address fundamental issues, such as
whether the underlying assumptions of the juvenile system make sense.
Others are geared toward providing lawmakers with useful information
about amenability, assuming that issue continues to be relevant. Finally,
research could also help individual courts and clinicians in their
assessments of amenability.
A. Premises

A key assumption underlying the traditional rationale for the juvenile
court is that juveniles are more amenable to treatment than adults." 4
Certainly that is the popular assumption, but no research directly tests
it." 5 Controlled studies matching different age groups, with other
112.
For instance, given their social and economic status in society, black youths
may become "more deeply embedded in and dependent upon the gangs and the illicit
economy that flourish in their neighborhoods," which might suggest particular kinds of
interventions. Delbert S. Elliot, Serious Violent Offenders: Onset, Developmental
Course, and Termination, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 19 (1994).
113.
KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 66, at 129-130 ("Lack of ethnic balance and
Anglo-American dominance of high-level juvenile justice jobs contribute to the
overrepresentation of certain minority groups in secure juvenile justice facilities....
Minority youth being processed in the juvenile justice system, as well as their parents, do
not always understand how the system works."). Cf. Sandra T. Azar & Corina L. Benjet,
A Cognitive Perspective on Ethnicity, Race, and Termination of ParentalRights, 18 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 249 (1994) (detailing ways in which cultural differences might affect
interviewers' ability to discover relevant information about abuse and neglect).
114.
For an argument that this rationale is problematic as a justification for a
separate juvenile justice system, see Slobogin et al., supra note 8, at 190-92.
115.
As one commentator, writing in 1976, noted:
[T]here is little evidence to support this simple and popular view. Maturational

variables (such as nature of offense and treatment modalities) kept
constant would help test this proposition. Such research would also help
identify the range of ages, if any, at which treatment becomes
significantly less successful. If such an age threshold exists, it would
provide empirical justification for designating the point at which
juvenile dispositional jurisdiction ends.
The possibility also exists that juveniles are not particularly amenable
to rehabilitation. For instance, if most juveniles "grow out" of their
criminal behavior 1 6 and are generally unresponsive to treatment, a
rehabilitation-oriented juvenile justice system may make no sense.
Straightforward incapacitation of delinquent youth until age twenty or
twenty-five might be the best means of protecting the community. As
the discussion below indicates, however, children appear to be eminently
treatable under certain circumstances.
B. Treatment Efficacy
A number of recent studies have tested the relative efficacy of various
types of treatment programs at reducing recidivism. 7 Contrary to
standard perceptions of treatment efficacy,1 18 much of this research
demonstrates that some types of prevention and early intervention
programs are successful at preventing and reducing even serious,
violent, and chronic delinquency. 1 9 Next steps might include additional
reform is not evidence of a greater amenability to rehabilitative programs; the
reform associated with age appears to occur whether or not the offender is
apprehended. Apparently, variables that account for maturational reform are not
influenced by treatment programs.
Simpson, supra note 8, at 1012-13 (footnotes omitted). Since this statement was made,
"meta-analyses show convincingly that experimental juvenile justice programs are
effective." HOWELL, supra note 59, at 191. However, research has not addressed
whether adults would respond in similar fashion to similar or different programs.
116.
According to Howell, "[u]ntil longitudinal studies collect self-reports of crime
on their samples through adulthood, the presumed midlife disappearance of crime will
remain an empirical question." HOWELL, supra note 59, at 168.
117.
The most thorough review of these studies is Lipsey, supra note 70.
118.
See Zimring, supra note 8.
119.
Lipsey found that juveniles in treatment groups have recidivism rates about
10% lower than untreated juveniles in control groups and that the best intervention
programs produced 20-30% reductions in recidivism rates. Id. A study of a
multisystemic treatment program showed that the recidivism rate for those who
completed the program (22.1%) was one-third of those who participated in other
treatment programs (71.4%) or refused treatment altogether (87.5%) and less than onehalf of those that dropped out of the multisystemic treatment (46.6%). Charles M.
Borduin et al., Multisystemic Treatment of Serious Juvenile Offenders: Long-Term
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meta-reviews of this research, 120 as well as follow-up studies seeking to
verify their findings. Solid reports of success rates are the best method
of convincing governments to fund specific programs and, on a more
fundamental level, of persuading them that the rehabilitative approach is
worth continuing (or reinvigorating, as the case may be). Of course,
accurate information about costs would need to be provided as well.
A second inquiry would focus on the crimogenic effects of
imprisonment. Although research suggests that juvenile disposition
reduces recidivism more (or fosters it less) than adult criminal court
sanctions,121 more research along these lines is necessary. Specifically,
it would be beneficial to study the effect of imprisoning juveniles
together with adults, compared to detaining juveniles with other
juveniles and compared to groups of juveniles who are not put in
detention.1 22 A likely confounding variable would be the treatment
provided to these three groups (because in-prison treatment is highly
likely to differ from outpatient treatment). However, if the outcome
variance between the first group and the other two is significant (in the
direction of higher recidivism of the juveniles incarcerated with adults),
the case against current transfer trends would be strengthened. If the
difference between the second and third groups is significant, a case for
Prevention of Criminality and Violence, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLIN. PSYCHOL. 569
(1995).
120. The National Research Council is planning such a consolidation of research
results, due by October 31, 1999. Janine Bilyeu, Project Summary, at 10 (Sept. 19,
1997).
121.
Jeffrey Fagan, Separating the Men From the Boys: The Comparative
Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among
Adolescent Felony Offenders, in SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS
238, 238 (James C. Howell et al. eds., 1995).
Although the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974
122.
mandates separation of adults from juveniles in detention facilities, the impetus for this
provision was not research indicating effects on recidivism but studies showing the
deplorable conditions in which juveniles detained with adults were housed. Hearings
Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See generally Fagan, supra note
121, at 255 ("replications of this effort are needed, both within the study sites with new
cohorts and in other sites."). Similarly, study of incapacitative dispositions within the
juvenile system has been lacking. DeWitt L. Weatherly, Legal Intervention with
Juveniles Offenders, in 1 VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 315, 325
(Leonard J. Hertzberg et al., eds. 1990) ("Well-designed studies of the various outcomes
of correction [in the juvenile justice system] are relatively rare," quoting William H.
Barton & Rosemary Sarri, Where Are They Now? A Follow-Up Study of Youth in
Juvenile Correction Programs,25 CRIME & DELINQ. 162 (1979).

avoiding incapacitative approaches would be made.
C. Assessing Treatability
Courts and clinicians need guidance about how to evaluate treatment
potential. The current and continuing research on recidivism risk factors
might be reduced to instruments or checklists that can be used in the
field for this purpose. Research comparing the prediction success of
evaluations using these instruments to traditional approaches could then
be conducted.
Previous discussion suggested that, in addition to the risk factors
identified in the research, a juvenile's desire to change might be an
important consideration in the amenability determination. Researchers
might more directly test this assumption and, if it is borne out, develop
(culturally sensitive) methods for ascertaining it. Perhaps even more
important, a schema for convincing juveniles that change is worthwhile
might prove to be a useful "treatment" device in and of itself.
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A REDEFINITION OF TREATMENT
AMENABILITY

The foregoing analysis suggests that the law's definition of the
amenability to treatment concept ignores several important variables.
More significantly, the analysis suggests that the courts' application of
the factors that are considered relevant to the amenability determination
is often pretextual.1 23 Rather than representing a genuine attempt to
assess a child's treatability, courts' evaluation of amenability focuses
more on culpability and dangerousness.
The definition of treatment amenability should attempt to implement
the rehabilitative premise of the juvenile court. The place to start is the
term itself-"amenability" to "treatment." The dictionary definition of
124
amenability alludes both to "capability" and to "willingness;accordingly, amenability to treatment might mean either an ability to be
treated or a readiness to undergo treatment, or both. The concept of
123.
Cf. Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked Prejudice Leap'd Forth": Sanism and
Pretextuality in Mental Health Law, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3 (1999) (arguing that
much of mental health law is pretextual in the sense that it aims at achieving something
other than its stated goals).
124.

According to THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

(Stuart Berg Flexner ed., 2d ed. unabridged 1987), amenable means "ready or willing to
answer, act, agree, or yield; open to influence, persuasion or advice; agreeable;
submissive; tractable," as well as "capable of... being tested, tried, analyzed."
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treatment is somewhat more ambiguous. At one end of the spectrum it
might focus on medical or psychiatric modalities designed to reduce
recidivism. At the other, it might consist of any intervention by a
specialist designed to better a person's quality of life.
Compared to the traditional legal approach to juvenile treatment
amenability, this article has argued for a relatively narrow treatment
objective-reduction of recidivism-combined with a relatively broad
inquiry into the youth's offense history, character and attitudes toward
the need for change. A definition of treatment amenability that is
consistent with the points made in this article might read as follows:
A juvenile's amenability to treatment depends upon the extent to which: (1) those
aspects of the juvenile's personality and environment (2) that contribute
significantly to an increased risk of criminal behavior (3) can be ameliorated by
age [21 ] through individual, family or community-oriented intervention (4) that is
available under the juvenile court system and applicable law.

Below is a short elaboration of this definition, part by part.
(1) Aspects of the juvenile's personality and environment. This
definition contemplates a thorough anamnestic investigation of the
juvenile's offense history and other antisocial behavior, an assessment of
the juvenile's characterological and clinical traits, and an evaluation of
the effects on the youth of family, peers, school, work, and community.
Willingness to be treated would be gauged as well. Superficial analysis
of current and prior offenses and past treatment would be insufficient.
(2) Significant contribution to criminal behavior. All of this
information would be gathered for the purpose of identifying risk factors
that significantly correlate with criminal behavior. This position would
discourage assertion of juvenile court jurisdiction if the only outcome of
intervention would be the prevention of minor antisocial conduct or an
improvement in "personality" unrelated to reduction of criminal
propensities. More importantly, it would avoid the false distinction
between dangerousness and amenability that is found in many court
decisions and statutes. Under the proposed definition of amenability, the
relationship between the two constructs is explicitly inverse: A juvenile
is treatable if a juvenile court intervention is likely to lower the risk of
criminal behavior. If, on the other hand, the juvenile's dangerousness is
not treatable, transfer to adult court should be considered (although
given the crimogenic effect of adult dispositions, it should not

necessarily be automatic). 25 Contrary to the insinuation of many
12 6
amenability analysis does not have to neglect societal interests;
courts,
indeed, its sole purpose should be to determine how to prevent future
harm.
(3) Amelioration through individual, family or community
intervention up to age [21]. The interventions contemplated should be
designed to treat, reduce or modify the identified risk factors. The
wording in this part of the definition is meant to emphasize that such
interventions would include not only treatment of the individual, but
family therapy, restructuring of school or work, and community-oriented
or "multi-systemic" programs. The overall approach would be based on
the risk management model, involving constant monitoring of relevant
risk factors and periodic adjustment of treatment plans to fit changing
circumstances.' 27 The choice of age twenty-one as the cut-off for this
approach merely reflects the median age at which states end the
dispositional jurisdiction of the juvenile court.128 If research indicates
that a different age threshold better reflects optimal treatability, then the
appropriate adjustment can be made.
(4) Services availableto juvenile court system under applicable law.
Choosing among various programs is up to the court. But the 'court's
options are limited, not just by physical unavailability, but by law. To
the extent cooperation of third parties such as parents, extended family
members, employers and school officials is required to implement a
particular program, serious thought must be given to whether legal
methods exist to encourage, cajole, or coerce participation.
Furthermore, because the legislature is best equipped to balance funding
and efficacy concerns and because courts may otherwise lack the
authority, the options "available" under this definition should ultimately
depend upon the former body's deliberations. Ideally, the authority
granted to the juvenile court would transcend individual-centered,
localized treatment programs to the extent it is politically and financially
possible to so. Such a broad grant of authority would help juvenile
courts operate as "boundary-spanners,"'2 9 organizations that bring
125.
For further development of this point, see Slobogin et al., supra note 8, at 21315; 224-25.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32.
127.
For further elaboration of this model, see Slobogin et al., supra note 8, at 21524.
128.
Some states end dispositional age at 18, others go as high as 25. See STATE
RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME, supra note 56, at 15.
129.
Cf Henry J. Steadman, Boundary Spanners: A Key Component for the
Effective Interactionsof the Justice and Mental Health Systems, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
75 (1992). An example in the juvenile context is the Florida Juvenile Assessment
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together disparate community resources in an effort to help children
avoid a life of crime.
Compared to current conceptions of amenability, the definition of
amenability offered here is not so much a change in content, as it is a
change in emphasis. Offense and treatment history are relevant, but only
if probed for treatable risk factors. The overall focus is not the
juvenile's antisocial behavior per se but the interaction between the
juvenile and all aspects of his or her environment, including the
juvenile's willingness to change. Treatment is not narrowly conceived
as individual-centered but as group- and community-centered. This type
of definition-perhaps more finely tuned once research clearly identifies
treatable risk factors-should focus courts and professional evaluators
on the right issues in determining amenability. The task then becomes
providing the resources and energy to make treatment a viable option.

Center, which integrates at the entry level juvenile justice, mental health, social services,
child welfare, and education systems. R. Dembo & R. Brown, The Hillsborough County
Juvenile Assessment Center, 3 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT SUBSTANCE ABUSE 25 (1994). A
more theoretical description using "managerial" courts is offered by Barbara A. Babb,
Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in Family Law: A
Blueprintto Constructa Unified Family Court, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 469 (1998).
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